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Abstract. We investigate how a downstream merger a⁄ects input prices
and equilibrium pro￿ts when there are price interdependencies among ￿rms. To do
so, we develop a very simple model where di⁄erent inputs, provided by monopolist
suppliers, may be combined to produce di⁄erentiated products sold by oligopolist
downstream units. We show that when the number of ￿nal products that may
be produced is small, being an outsider is always better than participating in a
downstream merger. When instead the number of ￿nal products is su¢ ciently large,
some outsiders gain more than the participants but others lose. Thus if ￿rms are
uncertain about their rivals￿willingness to merge, they might still have incentives to
merge to eliminate the risk of being harmed by a merger between their competitors.
We also show that if the products are not too di⁄erentiated no subsequent merger
by the less bene￿tted/harmed ￿rms will take place.
JEL classi￿cation: L13; L41
Keywords: downstream mergers, ￿xed-proportions technologies, preemption
1. Introduction
It is well known from the literature on horizontal integration that, when ￿rms face identical
and constant marginal costs of production, mergers are always more pro￿table for the
outsiders, in both quantity and price competition settings, Salant et al., (1983), Deneckere
and Davidson, (1985). In these contexts, a typical free-rider problem would emerge:
even if mergers are pro￿table for the participants, each ￿rm may ￿nd it more convenient
to wait for other ￿rms to merge so as to gain a higher payo⁄, Stigler, (1950). This
however doesn￿ t explain why ￿rms usually oppose or try to prevent mergers involving
their competitors. Lommerud et al., (2003), show how the introduction of endogenous
input prices may provide a solution to the free-rider paradox. They consider a downstream
merger in a model where three oligopolist downstream units are served by plant-speci￿c
input suppliers. They show that, when ￿rms compete in quantities on the ￿nal market,
this type of merger is always pro￿table for the participants and more pro￿table for a
participant than for an outsider. The reason is that a merger induces the input suppliers
￿This paper has been extracted from my PhD thesis at the University of York. I am grateful to my
supervisor, Peter Simmons, for his valuable comments and suggestions. The responsibility for remaining
errors lies entirely with me.
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of the participants to set lower prices for their inputs; since the inputs are complements,
also the outsiders￿suppliers decrease their prices but by less; this means that input prices
are always lower for the participants and this obviously contributes positively to the
pro￿tability of a merger, thus eliminating any incentive to free-ride.
The complementarity between input prices is essential for these results to hold and it
arises from the fact that each input supplier serves only one out of many oligopolist down-
stream units; often, however, we observe that ￿rms purchase their inputs from di⁄erent
suppliers, who, in turn, serve many independent downstream units. The purpose of this
work is precisely to investigate the incentives to merge in these types of settings. To do
so, we develop a model in which di⁄erent inputs, provided by monopolist suppliers, may
be combined in ￿xed proportions to produce di⁄erentiated products sold by oligopolist
￿rms.
In section 2, we show that when the number of ￿nal products that may be produced
is small, being an outsider is always better than participating. This happens because
a merger induces some of the suppliers of the participants to set lower prices for their
inputs, thus producing a positive externality to some of the outsiders using the same
inputs, whose price conditions improve more than for the participants.
When the number of ￿nal products is su¢ ciently large, however, the incentives to
merge may drastically change. This is shown in section 3, where, following a merger, the
outsiders combining some of the inputs used by the participants bene￿t from stronger
cost reductions than the participants, but the outsiders using di⁄erent inputs experience
an increase in their production costs. If ￿rms are uncertain about their rivals￿willingness
to merge, then they might still have incentives to merge to eliminate the risk of being
harmed by a merger between their competitors.
Merging as a strategy to preempt rivals￿mergers is also exempli￿ed in Nilssen and
Sorgard (1998), who analyse the interdependence of merging decisions over time when
there are cost savings following a merger. Also, Fridolfsson and Stennek (2002) show that,Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 3
although mergers are unpro￿table, ￿rms may still have incentives to merge to increase
their market share. Brito, (2003), using a model of spatial competition, shows that even
if some outsiders bene￿t from a merger more than the participants, there may still be
incentives to merge to eliminate the risk of being the less bene￿tted outsiders.
In section 4, we investigate whether the initial merger might trigger subsequent mergers
by the ￿rms less bene￿tted or harmed and whether in this case the initial merger would
still be pro￿table. To do that we limit our attention to the case where only horizontal
integration in the downstream market is feasible. We ￿nd that if the products are not
too di⁄erentiated then no harmed ￿rm would have incentive to respond by merging. The
initial merged units however might also consider the possibility of subsequent mergers by
some of the initially bene￿tted outsiders. We ￿nd that there are always incentives for
these units to merge with another bene￿tted outsider and that subsequent mergers by
these ￿rms always increase the pro￿tability of the initial merger but only when the ￿rst
merged units use di⁄erent inputs.
In section 5 we conclude and make some suggestions for future research.
2. The case of three input suppliers
We ￿rst consider the case in which the number of ￿nal goods that may be produced is
so small that ￿rms will always prefer to stay out of a merger. Suppose there are three
di⁄erent inputs, x1, x2 and x3, that may be combined in ￿xed proportions to produce
three di⁄erent ￿nal goods, q1, q2 and q3. More speci￿cally, we assume:
q1 = x1 = x2
q2 = x1 = x3
q3 = x2 = x3Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 4
where one unit for each of two di⁄erent inputs is required to produce one unit of each
output variety.
The inputs are supplied by three monopolist ￿rms who serve three oligopolist down-
stream units, each producing a di⁄erent variety of the ￿nal good, q.
Suppose that the degree of di⁄erentiation between any pair of varieties is the same
and equal to 0 ￿ b ￿ 1 and let wj be the price per unit of input j = 1;2;3.
Thus the demand facing each individual ￿rm i is




and the individual pro￿ts may be expressed as:
￿1 = (A ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w2)q1
￿2 = (A ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w3)q2
￿3 = (A ￿ q3 ￿ b(q1 + q2) ￿ w2 ￿ w3)q3




2(w1 ￿ bw3 + w2) + A(b ￿ 2)




2(w1 ￿ bw2 + w3) + A(b ￿ 2)




2(w2 ￿ bw1 + w3) + A(b ￿ 2)
b2 ￿ b ￿ 2
From which we can derive the input demands:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 5
x1 = q1 + q2 =
2w1 + A(b ￿ 2) + w2(1 ￿ b) + w3(1 ￿ b)
(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)
x2 = q1 + q3 =
2w2 + A(b ￿ 2) + w1(1 ￿ b) + w3(1 ￿ b)
(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)
x3 = q2 + q3 =
2w3 + A(b ￿ 2) + w1(1 ￿ b) + w2(1 ￿ b)
(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)
Given the candidate equilibrium quantities each upstream unit chooses input prices
simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximise pro￿ts. These are given by:
￿U
j = xj(wj ￿ C)
for each j = 1;2;3, and where C is the constant unit cost of production, common to







A(b ￿ 2) ￿ 2C
b ￿ 3























(A ￿ 2C)2(2 ￿ b)
(b + 1)(b ￿ 3)2
Now consider a horizontal merger between ￿rms 1 and 2 in the downstream market;
in this case, the post-merger entity maximises:
￿12 = (A ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w2)q1 + (A ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w3)q2Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 6
while the other ￿rms continue to act independently.
The Nash solution to this problem is characterised by:
w2 = w3 < w1
where
w1 =
(5A ￿ 2C)b3 ￿ 2(4C + 5A)b2 ￿ 8(2A + C)b + 24(a + c)
2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18
w2 = w3 =
Ab(b2 ￿ 5) ￿ b2(3C + 2A) + 6(a + c)
2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18
Mergers are pro￿table for the participants if ￿12￿2￿N
D > 0; as shown in Figure 1, this
is the case only if the degree of product di⁄erentiation is not too low, for b ￿ 0:85.
Figure 1: merger pro￿tability for the participants
Mergers are instead always pro￿table for the downstream outsiders, ￿3 ￿￿N
D > 0, and
there is never a merger advantage, ￿12 ￿ 2￿3 < 0.
The intuition behind these results may be traced by considering how a downstream
merger a⁄ects the pricing behaviour of the input suppliers. Following a merger, the
demand for input 1 becomes less price responsive; input 1 in fact is used in the production
of both good 1 and 2 and thus the merged unit cannot shift production between its two
plants to induce lower prices from its supplier; as a result input 1 price increases.Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 7
A merger instead increases the demand elasticity with respect to inputs 2 and 3; this
e⁄ect is due to the fact that, for the case of the merged unit, input 2 is used only in the
production of good 1 whereas input 3 is used only in the production of good 2; thus the
merged unit can now shift production between the two goods to induce lower input prices
from its suppliers; as a result the prices of input 2 and 3 decrease thus bene￿tting the ￿rm
left out of the merger, who now faces more favourable input price conditions. Whether
the merged unit will earn or lose with respect to a pre-merger situation will depend on
the relative strength of these two e⁄ects. Figure 1 shows that the merger pro￿tability for
the merged unit is ￿rst increasing, but at a decreasing rate, with the degree of product
substitutability, till it reaches a maximum at b = 0:53 and then starts to decrease to
become negative for su¢ ciently low degrees of product di⁄erentiation; for 0 ￿ b ￿ 0:53,
in fact, the input prices are strategic substitutes and, following a merger, the reduction in
the prices of input 2 and 3 is relatively small; for b > 0:53, however, the prices of input 2
and 3 become strategic complements so that the incentives to set lower prices for input 2
are reinforced by the price reduction for input 3 and vice versa. As b gets su¢ ciently large,
the reduction in the prices of input 2 and 3 is so strong that the input price conditions for
the outsider become extremely favourable and the participants cannot any longer increase
prices to pro￿tably counteract the fall in demand.
The most interesting results however concern the pro￿tability of the upstream units,
which is always negative. In our model with ￿rm speci￿c input suppliers we found that,
in the absence of externality e⁄ects, a merger was always unpro￿table for the upstream
units serving the merged entity; our new model seems to con￿rm this result, if we consider
that now all the upstream units serve the merged entity. The pro￿tability of the three
suppliers however is a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways. For the upstream units providing inputs
2 and 3, the main reason why a merger is unpro￿table is the decrease of their input price
not compensated by a su¢ ciently strong demand increase: lower input prices, in fact,
induce higher input demand from the outsider, but due to the increase in the price ofProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 8
input 1, lower demand from the participants. The supplier of input 1, instead, following a
horizontal merger, is induced to increase its input price, which causes a stronger reduction
in its input demand.
3. The case of five input suppliers
In this section we will show that when many di⁄erent inputs may be combined in ￿xed
proportions to produce di⁄erentiated products then the participants may gain more than
some of the outsiders; even if in this case there is never an absolute merger advantage,
￿rms may still have incentives to participate for the fear of being the less bene￿tted
outsiders.
We now consider the case in which there are ￿ve di⁄erent inputs, x, that may be
combined to produce ten di⁄erentiated products, q. More speci￿cally we assume that
one unit of input i = 1::5 may be combined with one unit of input j = 1::5, with i 6= j,
to produce one unit of a di⁄erentiated product qk, with k = 1::10: In this case each
downstream unit always operates at a point where:
q1 = x1 = x2
q2 = x1 = x3
q3 = x1 = x4
q4 = x1 = x5
q5 = x2 = x3Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 9
q6 = x2 = x4
q7 = x2 = x5
q8 = x3 = x4
q9 = x3 = x5
q10 = x4 = x5
The demand facing each individual downstream oligopolist is therefore:




and the input demands are:
x1 = q1 + q2 + q3 + q4
x2 = q1 + q5 + q6 + q7
x3 = q2 + q5 + q8 + q9
x4 = q3 + q6 + q8 + q10
x5 = q4 + q7 + q9 + q10Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 10











(A ￿ 2C)(5b + 2)





(A ￿ 2C)2(5b + 2)2





(A ￿ 2C)2(2 ￿ b)(5b + 2)
(9b + 2)(b + 2)2
for each i = 1::10 and for all j = 1::5
We ￿rst consider a horizontal merger between two downstream oligopolists purchasing
the inputs from di⁄erent suppliers, for example, ￿rms 1 and 10. In this context, the pro￿ts
of the merged entity may be expressed as:
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10
ql ￿ w4 ￿ w5
1
Aq10
Notice that in this case all the input suppliers, apart from the supplier providing input
3, serve the merged units; thus the equilibrium input prices wj are identical for j = 1::5
and j 6= 3:
wj =
(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)(5b3 ￿ 47b2 + 33b + 14)C ￿ (b ￿ 1)(b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 14b2 + 45b + 14)A
(b + 2)(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)
w3 =
2(4b5 ￿ 35b2 + 226b3 ￿ 132b ￿ 28 ￿ 60b4)C ￿ (b ￿ 2)(b4 ￿ 20b3 + 106b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 28)A
2(b + 2)(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)
and w3 > wjProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 11
Figure 2: merger pro￿tability of ￿rms using input 3
Thus mergers are always more pro￿table for the outsiders not purchasing input 3, but
less pro￿table for ￿rms using input 3. Further, if the degree of product di⁄erentiation
is su¢ ciently low, the merging process causes the pro￿ts of ￿rms using input 3 to fall,
Figure 2.
If we compare the input demand elasticities before and after a merger, we ￿nd that a
merger makes the input demands for the participants more price responsive; this induces
their input suppliers to set lower prices. The intuition is that now the participants use
di⁄erent inputs and therefore they can shift their production between the two composite
goods to induce lower input prices from their suppliers. Thus the prices of all the in-
puts used by the participants decrease and this produces a positive externality to all the
outsiders using the same inputs; the cost of production for these ￿rms decreases.
This implies that, following a merger, the participants and the outsiders using the
same inputs will face the same input price conditions and, as in the case of exogenous
input prices, the outsiders will take a free-ride earning higher pro￿ts.
The outsiders using the other inputs, instead, will face less favourable price conditions;
following a merger, in fact, we can show that the demands for these inputs get less price











b2 ￿ 2 ￿ 5b

















￿ ￿ is positive and increasing with the degree of sub-
stitutability. Thus, following a merger, the input suppliers not serving the merged units
will set higher prices for their inputs and the incentives to do so will be stronger the lower
is the degree of product di⁄erentiation.
The intuition is that, following a merger, all the outsiders using at least one of the
inputs used by the participants will bene￿t from a reduction in their production costs; this
will induce them to increase their levels of production and therefore their demand of the
other inputs, whose price therefore increases. When the degree of product di⁄erentiation
is su¢ ciently great the incentives for the suppliers not serving the participants to set
higher prices are lower, so that also the pro￿tability of the outsiders purchasing from
them will improve.
As in the case of only 3 suppliers, all the upstream units serving the merged entity
are worse o⁄, Figure 3; this seems to con￿rm that horizontal downstream mergers are
always unpro￿table for the suppliers of the participants; and the main explanation is that
now the participants can shift their production between the two composite goods thus
inducing stronger price competition between their suppliers, who are therefore forced to
set lower prices.
The pro￿tability of the upstream unit producing input 3 instead improves, if the degree
of substitutability is not too high, Figure 4.
We now consider a merger between two downstream units purchasing one of their
inputs from the same supplier, for example a merger between ￿rms 1 and 2. In this case
the merged units maximise:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 13
Figure 3: merger pro￿tability of the suppliers serving the merged units
Figure 4: merger pro￿tability of the supplier of input 3Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 14
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=2
ql ￿ w1 ￿ w3
1
Aq2
and the Nash solution to this problem is characterised by:
w4 = w5 > w1 > w2 = w3
As in the case of only three inputs, the prices of inputs 2 and 3 fall, while the price of
input 1 increases. The other input prices increase.
Again the intuition behind these results may be found analysing the input demand
elasticities before and after a merger. It may be shown that input 2 and 3 input demands
get more price responsive, thus leading their suppliers to set lower prices; this happens
because the merged units may shift production between the two composite goods thus
inducing ￿ercer price competition between their input suppliers. Input 1 demand, instead,
becomes less price responsive and this induces its input supplier to set a higher price: since
input 1 is used in identical proportion in the production of both the composite goods,
there is no possibility of substitution between the two composite goods for the merged
unit and this increases the bargaining power of its supplier.
The prices of the inputs not used by the participants are a⁄ected in two opposite ways:
the decrease in the prices of inputs 2 and 3 produces a positive externality to all the out-
siders using at least one of these inputs, who therefore increase their demand of the other
inputs; the increase in the price of input 1 however will produce a negative externality to
all the outsiders using this input, who will therefore decrease their demand of the other
inputs; since however there are more outsiders using inputs 2 and 3 than outsiders using
input 1, and thus more outsiders bene￿tting from improved price conditions, the net e⁄ect
will be an increase in the demand of the other inputs, whose price will therefore increase.
We can now analyse the implications in terms of ￿rms￿pro￿tability of these price
changes. The less bene￿tted ￿rms are those using the inputs not used by the participants;
the prices of these inputs, as we have seen, increase more than any other input￿ s, thusProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 15
Figure 5: pro￿tability of the less bene￿tted outsiders
Figure 6: merger pro￿tability for the ￿rms using the participants￿most expensive input
reducing the input demands of the downstream units using them. The pro￿tability for
these ￿rms is always negative, as shown in Figure 5.
For the ￿rms combining input 1 (the participants￿input, whose price increases) with
any other inputs not used by the participants, price conditions, following a merger, worsen
though less than for the previous ￿rms; the implications in terms of pro￿tability are
however negative also in this case, Figure 6.
The most bene￿tted ￿rm uses the same inputs as the participants whose prices, fol-
lowing a merger, decrease: pro￿tability for this ￿rm is always positive, Figure 7.
The second more bene￿tted ￿rms are those combining one of the least expensive inputs
with one of the most expensive inputs; also for these ￿rms pro￿tability is always positive,Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 16
Figure 7: merger pro￿tability of the most bene￿tted outsider
Figure 8: merger pro￿tability for the ￿rms combining the less expensive inputs with the
more expensive ones
Figure 8.
A merger is always pro￿table for the participants, as shown in Figure 9, but less
pro￿table than for the outsiders using at least one of the least expensive inputs.
Finally we consider the implications of these price changes on the pro￿tability of the
suppliers. We start by considering the pro￿tability of the suppliers of the merged units: as
expected mergers are always unpro￿table for the upstream units serving the participants,
Figures 10 and 11.
For the suppliers not serving the participants, instead, a merger is always pro￿table if
the degree of substitutability is not too low, Figure 12; as b increases, in fact the incentivesProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 17
Figure 9: merger pro￿tability for the participants
Figure 10: merger pro￿tability of the supplier of the more expensive input provided to
the participants
Figure 11: merger pro￿tability of the input supplier of the less expensive input provided
to the participantsProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 18
Figure 12: merger pro￿tability of the input suppliers not serving the participants
for the input suppliers to set higher prices tend to increase thus reducing the input demand
from their purchasers.
4. Subsequent mergers
One question is whether this type of merger might encourage subsequent mergers by the
￿rms less bene￿tted or harmed and whether in this case the ￿rst merged units would still
have incentives to merge. To investigate this issue we limit our attention to the case in
which only horizontal integration in the downstream market is feasible. This assumption
is not implausible if we consider that the upstream market is much more concentrated than
the downstream market and that vertical integration could be used by the downstream
units to price discriminate against their rivals.
We further assume that only two ￿rm mergers are allowed. For the case of ￿ve input
suppliers we have seen that, following a downstream merger between two units using
di⁄erent inputs, the outsiders using the other input, input 3, will face less favourable cost
conditions. Thus these outsiders, units 2, 5, 8 and 9, might have incentives to respond
by merging to recover the lost pro￿ts. More speci￿cally, suppose that unit 2 merges with
unit 5 and that unit 8 joins in a merger with unit 9. The pro￿ts of the post-merger units
in this case are given by:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 19
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10





@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=2




@A ￿ q5 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=5





@A ￿ q8 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=8




@A ￿ q9 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=9
ql ￿ w3 ￿ w5
1
Aq9
where ￿m denotes the pro￿ts of the initial merged units.
The Nash solution to this problem is:
wi =
(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)(3b4 ￿ 40b3 + 117b2 ￿ 68b ￿ 28)C + (b ￿ 1)(b ￿ 2)(5b3 ￿ 45b2 + 88b + 28)A
3b6 ￿ 45b5 + 191b4 ￿ 107b3 ￿ 574b2 + 460b + 168




3b6 ￿ 537b3 ￿ 53b5 + 297b4 + 54b2 + 260b + 56
￿
C + (b ￿ 2)(4b2 ￿ 17b + 14)(b2 ￿ 7b ￿ 2)A
3b6 ￿ 45b5 + 191b4 ￿ 107b3 ￿ 574b2 + 460b + 168
where wi < w3
Thus subsequent mergers between the less bene￿tted units lead to the same pattern of
equilibrium input prices and therefore the relative merging gains do not change: mergers
are always pro￿table for the originally merged units and for the outsiders, but more for
the outsiders; they may instead be unpro￿table for the new merged units, if the degree
of product di⁄erentiation is su¢ ciently low, for b > 0:48, Figure 13. In this case however
the less bene￿tted units would have no incentive to merge in the ￿rst place; this is shownProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 20
Figure 13: merger pro￿tability for the new merged units
Figure 14: merger incentives for the new merged units
in Figure 14 where for b > 0:45, the pre-merger pro￿tability, though negative, is always
greater than the post-merger pro￿tability.
The intuition behind this result may be traced by considering that the most expensive
input, input 3, is common to all the less bene￿tted units and thus a merger between these
units cannot induce lower prices for this input.
The ￿rst merged units however might also consider whether there are incentives for the
initially more bene￿tted outsiders to merge with one of the less bene￿tted ￿rms. We ￿nd
that these incentives exist only if the two ￿rms use di⁄erent inputs and if the products
are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. However the more bene￿tted units have always stronger
incentives to merge with another bene￿tted unit using di⁄erent inputs; more speci￿cally,Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 21
both units 3 and 7 and units 4 and 6 could earn more from a merger between them rather
than from a merger with one of the less bene￿tted units using di⁄erent inputs. In this
case the post-merger pro￿ts are given by:
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10





@A ￿ q3 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=3




@A ￿ q7 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=7





@A ￿ q4 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=4




@A ￿ q6 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=6
ql ￿ w2 ￿ w4
1
Aq6
while the less bene￿tted ￿rms continue to behave independently. The Nash equilibrium




(3b + 1)(12b3 ￿ 47b2 + 33b + 14)C ￿ (b ￿ 1)(b ￿ 2)(9b2 ￿ 24b ￿ 7)A
6b4 ￿ 9b3 ￿ 38b2 + 43b + 14




(54b4 + 138b ￿ 180b3 + 32b2 + 28)C + (￿9b4 ￿ 130b2 + 63b3 + 60b + 28)A
6b4 ￿ 9b3 ￿ 38b2 + 43b + 14
where w3 > wi
and mergers are always pro￿table for the merged units, but may be unpro￿table for
the outsiders if the products are close substitutes, Figure15. Further, since these merg-
ers induce lower input prices for the participants, the pro￿tability of the initial merger
improves more than the pro￿tability of the initially more bene￿tted outsiders. This is
shown in Figure 16 where the ￿rst merged units earn exactly the same pro￿ts as the newProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 22
Figure 15: merger pro￿tability for the outsiders
merged units. When however the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated also the outsiders
have incentives to merge. In this case the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium yields the
following equilibrium input prices:
wi =
(3b + 1)(24b + 7 ￿ 7b2)C + (27b + 7)(1 ￿ b)A
11b2 + 21 ￿ 21b3 + 85b
(1)
for i = 1;2;4;5
w3 =
(41b + 45b2 + 7 ￿ 21b3)C + (22b ￿ 17b2 + 7)A
11b2 + 21 ￿ 21b3 + 85b
(2)
with w3 > wi
and we get the same pattern of equilibrium input prices which leaves unchanged the
relative merging gains. Mergers may still be unpro￿table for the units using the most
expensive input, input 3, if the products are not su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, Figure 17.
Since however these mergers further reduce the other input prices, the pro￿tability of the
other units increases, as shown in Figure 18.
Thus an initial merger between ￿rms using di⁄erent inputs is always pro￿table for
the participants because, by inducing lower input prices from its suppliers, it triggers
subsequent mergers that further decrease the monopoly power of the upstream units
serving the original merged units.Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 23
Figure 16: merger pro￿tability for the participants
Figure 17: Merger pro￿tability for the integrated units using a common input
Figure 18: merger pro￿tability for the integrated units using di⁄erent inputProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 24
We now consider the case in which the initial merger is between two units using a
common input. As in the previous scenario, we assume that only one type of integration
is feasible and that only two ￿rm mergers are allowed by the antitrust authority. Are
there incentives for the harmed downstream units to respond by merging? And if this is
the case would be mergers still pro￿table for the ￿rst merged units? Before investigating
this issue, we must notice that now only three units are harmed by the merging process:
unit 10, which uses the two most expensive inputs (inputs 4 and 5), and units 3 and 4 that
combine the most expensive input used by the participants, input 1, with respectively one
of the most expensive inputs, inputs 4 and 5. Since only two ￿rm mergers are allowed,
one ￿rm will necessarily be left out. We ￿rst consider the case in which units 3 and 4
agree to join in a merger. In this case the post merger pro￿ts are:
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=2





@A ￿ q3 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=3




@A ￿ q4 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=4
ql ￿ w1 ￿ w5
1
Aq4
where ￿m denotes the pro￿ts of the initially merged units. We notice that input 1 is
used by both the merged units in the production of both their products. This means that
the participants cannot shift production between their two plants to induce ￿ercer price
competition between their suppliers; as a result of a merger, we should therefore expect a
higher price for input 1. Each of the other inputs is instead used only in the production of
one good; in this case the participants may force their suppliers to set lower input prices.
Since input 1 is used only by the participants, a merger of this type should bene￿t all
the outsiders thus eliminating any incentive for subsequent mergers. But there is still the
question whether this merger is also pro￿table for the originally merged units. If this were
not the case then the initial merger might not be carried through in the ￿rst place.Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 25
Figure 19: merger pro￿tability for the merged units
Solving for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, we ￿nd that the solution is charac-
terised by:
wi =
(5b + 2)(b4 ￿ 31b3 + 117b2 ￿ 68b ￿ 28)C + (b ￿ 1)(b ￿ 2)(17b2 ￿ 92b ￿ 28)A
￿168 ￿ 476b + 458b2 + 237b3 ￿ 119b4 + 5b5
for i = 2;3;4;5
w1 =
￿
￿12b5 + 338b4 ￿ 1118b3 + 252b2 + 536b + 112
￿
C + (b ￿ 2)(b4 ￿ 48b3 + 226b2 ￿ 132b ￿ 56)A
￿168 ￿ 476b + 458b2 + 237b3 ￿ 119b4 + 5b5
where w1 > wi
Thus following a merger, all the outsiders face lower input prices and as a result
earn higher pro￿ts. The pro￿tability of the participants however may be negative if
the products are not su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, Figure 19. If however the products are
not enough di⁄erentiated the new merged units would have no incentive to respond by
merging. This is shown in Figure 20, where for b > 0:47, pro￿ts for these units are always
higher if they don￿ t merge.
Consider now the case in which unit 10 merges with unit 3. In this context, the pro￿ts
of the post-merger units are:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 26
Figure 20: merger incentives for the new merged units
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=2





@A ￿ q3 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=3




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10
ql ￿ w4 ￿ w5
1
Aq10
This scenario seems more favourable for the originally merged units. A merger between
these units in fact will induce a higher price for input 1, but the merger between units 3
and 10 will have an opposite e⁄ect. In this case the Nash equilibrium is characterised by:
w1 < w5 < w2 = w3 < w4
and mergers are always pro￿table for the originally merged units, but more pro￿table
for some of the outsiders. The most bene￿tted outsiders use the less expensive inputs,
input 1 and input 5, and they always bene￿t from a merger. The outsiders using the most
expensive inputs, however, might be harmed if products are close substitutes, Figure 21.
The pro￿tability of the new merged units instead may be positive only if the products are
su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, Figure 22.
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that each originally harmed outsider
might ￿nd it more convenient to wait for the other harmed units to merge. If all the
harmed units have the same reasoning then a possible outcome could be a hold up situationProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 27
Figure 21: merger pro￿tability of the outsiders using the most expensive inputs
Figure 22: merger pro￿tability of the new merged unitsProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 28
in which no further merger follows to the initial one. Since however a merger with the most
harmed outsider is always less pro￿table, another possible outcome could be a merger
between the less harmed units, which is the worst possible scenario for the originally
merged units. Anticipating all this, would be the original merger still carried through?
If the products are not too di⁄erentiated, then the original harmed units would have no
incentives to merge and the initial merger would not trigger subsequent mergers by the
harmed units.
The initial merged units however might also consider the possibility of subsequent
mergers between other units. For instance, units 6, 7, 8, 9, though bene￿tting from the
initial merger, could improve their pro￿tability by merging with the unit using di⁄erent
inputs; more speci￿cally, if there were no merger restrictions, unit 6 could pro￿tably merge
with unit 9 and unit 7 with unit 8. But if these two mergers took place, then unit 5 and
unit 10 could improve their pro￿tability by merging in turn. The post-merger pro￿ts in
this case are given by:
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=2





@A ￿ q5 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=5




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10





@A ￿ q6 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=6




@A ￿ q9 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=9





@A ￿ q7 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=7




@A ￿ q8 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=8





@A ￿ q3 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=3
qk ￿ w1 ￿ w4
1
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￿4 =
0
@A ￿ q4 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=4
qk ￿ w1 ￿ w5
1
Aq4
The Nash solution to this game is characterised by the following equilibrium input
prices:
w2 = w3 < w4 = w5 < w1
and mergers are always pro￿table for the new merged units and the outsiders but may
be unpro￿table for the ￿rst participants if the products are not su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated,
Figures 23 ￿ 25.
The intuition behind this result is very simple: in contrast to the ￿rst merged units,
each of the new merged entities uses di⁄erent inputs and thus may shift production be-
tween its two goods to induce lower prices from its suppliers and enjoy better cost condi-
tions.
A comparison of Figures 9 and 25 suggests however that the initial merger would be
still carried through, if the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. In this case however
also the last two outsiders would have incentives to merge and the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium would yield the same input prices as in (1) and (2) but with w1 > wi and
i = 2;3;4;5. As we have already shown, in this case mergers are always pro￿table for the
units using di⁄erent inputs, but may be unpro￿table for the ￿rms using a common input
(in this case, input 1), if the products are not enough di⁄erentiated, Figures 17 ￿ 18 .
Anticipating the reactions of the non-merging ￿rms, the ￿rst merged units would
choose to merge, whenever possible, with a ￿rm using di⁄erent inputs; in this case, in
fact, the cost reduction induced by a merger is stronger and subsequent mergers have a
positive e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of the initial merger.
5. Conclusions
We have analysed the pro￿tability of downstream mergers when a limited number of
inputs, provided by monopolist suppliers, may be combined to produce di⁄erentiated
products sold by oligopolist downstream ￿rms. We have shown that when the numberProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 30
Figure 23: merger pro￿tability for the new merged units
Figure 24: Merger pro￿tability for the outsiders
Figure 25: merger pro￿tability for the initial merged unitsProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 31
of products that may be produced is very small, it is always better to be an outsider
rather than participate in a merger. This happens because, following a merger, some
input suppliers of the merged units are induced to set lower prices for their inputs, thus
producing a positive externality to some of the outsiders using the same inputs; cost
conditions for these outsiders improve more than for the participants and this obviously
contributes positively to their pro￿tability.
When instead the number of ￿nal products is su¢ ciently large, the incentives to merge
may drastically change: even if some outsiders bene￿t more from a merger others lose and
this may create incentives for ￿rms to merge to eliminate the risk of being harmed by
a merger between competitors. We have considered two di⁄erent scenarios: a merger
between ￿rms using di⁄erent inputs and a merger between ￿rms using a common input.
We have shown that in the ￿rst scenario, a merger induces the input suppliers of the
participants to set lower prices for their inputs. Thus following a merger the participants
and the outsiders using the same inputs will face identical cost conditions and, as in the
case of exogenous input prices, the outsiders will take a free-ride and earn higher pro￿ts.
The outsiders using the other inputs, instead, will face less favourable price conditions and,
if the products are not too di⁄erentiated, earn lower pro￿ts. We therefore investigated
whether in this case there might be incentives for the harmed units to respond by merging.
Our analysis shows that these incentives exist only when the less bene￿tted units earn
positive pro￿ts and therefore when the products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. In this
case, however, a merger between the less bene￿tted units leads to the same pattern of
equilibrium input prices and as a consequence doesn￿ t a⁄ect the relative merging gains.
Thus even if a merger is more pro￿table for some of the outsiders, ￿rms may still have
incentives to merge to preempt a merger between their competitors even if this merger
may trigger subsequent mergers from the less bene￿tted ￿rms. Further, if the products
are not too di⁄erentiated, no harmed unit will have incentives to merge.
For the case in which the initial merged units use a common input, we have shownProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 32
that a merger induces the input suppliers of the participants to set a higher price for the
common input but lower prices for the other inputs. This in turn produces a positive
externality to the outsiders using at least one of the less expensive inputs also used by the
participants, but a negative externality to all the other ￿rms. Also in this case we therefore
investigated the incentives for the harmed units to respond by merging. We showed that
each harmed unit might bene￿t more from a merger between the other harmed units and
that for each participant a merger with the most harmed outsider is always less pro￿table.
Thus we could ￿gure out two possible equilibrium outcomes: a hold up situation in which
no harmed unit would merge or alternatively a merger between the less harmed units. In
the ￿rst case the initial merged units would always have incentives to merge, but in the
second scenario they would be better o⁄ staying out of the merger and no initial merger
would be carried through. If however the products are not too di⁄erentiated, then the
initially harmed units would have no incentives to respond by merging and no subsequent
merger would follow. Thus if we limit our attention to the reactions of the less bene￿tted
or harmed units, the initial merger will always be carried through unless the products are
su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated.
The ￿rst merged units however might also consider the possibility of subsequent merg-
ers by other units. We have seen that in both scenarios there is always an incentive for
some of the initially bene￿tted units to merge with another bene￿tted unit using di⁄erent
inputs; this type of merger increases the pro￿tability of the initial merger when the ￿rst
merged units use di⁄erent inputs but may be unfavourable for the initial participants
when they use a common input. Thus mergers with ￿rms using di⁄erent inputs should be
always preferred to mergers with ￿rms using a common input, because, by reducing the
monopoly power of the suppliers, they induce greater cost savings for the participants.
In our analysis we considered only a limited number of inputs, but we believe that
the model may be easily extended to the case of many di⁄erent inputs. Our results
assumed ￿xed-proportion technologies. Thus our analysis could be extended to allow forProfitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 33
variable-proportions technologies or substitutability between di⁄erent inputs. Finally, in
our equilibrium analysis we assumed that only one type of integration was feasible. It
might be interesting to investigate which equilibrium structures would emerge if ￿rms
were allowed to form/break links with other units.
A. Appendix: equilibrium outcomes
A.1. The case of three input suppliers. Consider a horizontal merger between
￿rms 1 and 2 in the downstream market; in this case, the post-merger entity maximises:
￿12 = (A ￿ q1 ￿ b(q2 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w2)q1 + (A ￿ q2 ￿ b(q1 + q3) ￿ w1 ￿ w3)q2
while the other ￿rms continue to act independently.




w2(2b ￿ b2 ￿ 4) + w3(6b ￿ 3b2) + A(2b2 ￿ 6b + 4) + 4w1(b ￿ 1)




w3(2b ￿ b2 ￿ 4) + w2(6b ￿ 3b2) + A(2b2 ￿ 6b + 4) + 4w1(b ￿ 1)
b3 ￿ 3b2 + 2
q3 =
w3(2 + b) ￿ 2bw1 + w2(b + 2) ￿ 2A
b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2
Total input demands for the upstream units are:
x1 = q1 + q2
x2 = q1 + q3
x3 = q2 + q3Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 34
and, given the candidate equilibrium quantities, the solution to the upstream ￿rms￿
problem yields the equilibrium input prices:
w1 =
(5A ￿ 2C)b3 ￿ 2(4C + 5A)b2 ￿ 8(2A + C)b + 24(a + c)
2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18
w2 = w3 =
Ab(b2 ￿ 5) ￿ b2(3C + 2A) + 6(a + c)
2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18




(b + 1)(5b3 ￿ 10b2 ￿ 16b + 24)2(A ￿ 2C)2




(24 ￿ 2b3 + b4 ￿ 8b2)2(A ￿ 2C)2





(5b3 ￿ 10b2 ￿ 16b + 24)2(A ￿ 2C)2






(1 ￿ b)(b ￿ 3)2(b + 2)2(b2 + 4b ￿ 8)(A ￿ 2C)2
(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)(2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18)2
Mergers are pro￿table for the participants if:
￿12 ￿ 2￿N
D =
b(576 + 1568b ￿ 4144b2 ￿ 2851b6 + 1106b7 ￿ 1099b5)(A ￿ 2C)2
8(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18)2(b + 1)2(b ￿ 3)2 +
+
(6832b4 ￿ 2124b3 ￿ 191b9 + 25b10 + 266b8)(A ￿ 2C)2
8(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18)2(b + 1)2(b ￿ 3)2 > 0
Mergers are instead always pro￿table for the downstream outsiders:
￿3￿￿N
D =
b(b5 ￿ 8b4 + 15b3 + 22b2 ￿ 56b ￿ 16)(b6 ￿ 29b4 + 22b3 + 152b2 ￿ 80b ￿ 144)(A ￿ 2C)2
16(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18)2(b + 1)2(b ￿ 3)2 > 0
and there is never a merger advantage:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 35
￿12 ￿ 2￿3 =
b(29b6 ￿ 63b5 ￿ 192b4 + 388b3 + 432b2 ￿ 608b ￿ 192 ￿ b7)(A ￿ 2C)2
(b2 ￿ 2b ￿ 2)2(2b3 ￿ 7b2 ￿ 10b + 18)2 < 0
A.2. The case of ￿ve input suppliers.
A merger between two units using di⁄erent inputs. The pro￿ts of the merged
entity in this case may be expressed as:
￿m =
0
@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q10 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=10
ql ￿ w4 ￿ w5
1
Aq10
And all the input suppliers, apart from the supplier providing input 3, serve the merged
units; thus the equilibrium input prices wj are identical for j = 1::5 and j 6= 3:
wj =
(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)(5b3 ￿ 47b2 + 33b + 14)C ￿ (b ￿ 1)(b ￿ 2)(b3 ￿ 14b2 + 45b + 14)A
(b + 2)(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)
w3 =
2(4b5 ￿ 35b2 + 226b3 ￿ 132b ￿ 28 ￿ 60b4)C ￿ (b ￿ 2)(b4 ￿ 20b3 + 106b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 28)A
2(b + 2)(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)
qm =
(b ￿ 2)(3b5 ￿ 52b4 ￿ 136b + 234b3 ￿ 61b2 ￿ 28)(A ￿ 2C)




(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)(b4 ￿ 20b3 + 106b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 28)(A ￿ 2C)




(3b5 ￿ 52b4 ￿ 136b + 234b3 ￿ 61b2 ￿ 28)(A ￿ 2C)




(b + 1)(b ￿ 2)2(3b5 ￿ 52b4 ￿ 136b + 234b3 ￿ 61b2 ￿ 28)2(A ￿ 2C)2




(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)2(b4 ￿ 20b3 + 106b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 28)2(A ￿ 2C)2




(3b5 ￿ 52b4 ￿ 136b + 234b3 ￿ 61b2 ￿ 28)2(A ￿ 2C)2




(4b3 ￿ 39b2 + 24b + 16)(b3 ￿ 14b2 + 45b + 14)2(b ￿ 2)(1 ￿ b)(A ￿ 2C)2




(b4 ￿ 20b3 + 106b2 ￿ 64b ￿ 28)2(b2 ￿ 5b ￿ 2)(2 ￿ b)(A ￿ 2C)2
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(b + 2)2(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)2
where ￿rms i = 2;5;8;9 use input 3 whereas ￿rms k = 3;4;6;7 don￿ t.
Mergers are always more pro￿table for the outsiders not purchasing input 3:
￿m ￿ 2￿Dk =
1
2
(b ￿ 3)b2(3b5 ￿ 52b4 + 234b3 ￿ 61b2 ￿ 136b ￿ 28)2(A ￿ 2C)2
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)2(b + 2)2(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)2 < 0
but less pro￿table for ￿rms using input 3:
￿m ￿ 2￿Di =
b(￿64744b4 + 4512b ￿ 248468b7 + 117389b6 + 11056b2 ￿ 18484b3 + 448)
2(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)2(b + 2)2(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)2 +
+
b(89401b5 ￿ 38023b9 + 144450b8 + 5094b10 + 9b12 ￿ 340b11)
2(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)2(b + 2)2(3b4 ￿ 44b3 + 168b2 ￿ 95b ￿ 42)2 > 0




@A ￿ q1 ￿ b
10 X
k=1;k6=1




@A ￿ q2 ￿ b
10 X
l=1;l6=2
ql ￿ w1 ￿ w3
1
Aq2
and the Nash solution to this problem is characterised by:Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 37
w4 = w5 > w1 > w2 = w3
where
w1 =
a(2 ￿ b)(76b6 ￿ 1587b5 + 10491b4 ￿ 21806b3 + 3456b2 + 8512b + 1568)
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
+
￿
(￿543b7 + 9770b6 ￿ 54129b5 + 90182b4 + 25032b3 ￿ 49784b2 ￿ 24752b ￿ 3136)c
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
w2 = w3 =
a(1 ￿ b)(b ￿ 2)(93b5 ￿ 1703b4 + 9368b3 ￿ 12860b2 ￿ 9968b ￿ 1568)
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
+
￿
(￿577b7 + 10256b6 ￿ 56125b5 + 93346b4 + 24472b3 ￿ 51816b2 ￿ 25200b ￿ 3136)c
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
w4 = w5 =
a(2 ￿ b)(46b6 ￿ 1137b5 + 8763b4 ￿ 20794b3 + 3912b2 + 8512b + 1568)
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
+
￿
(￿47960b2 ￿ 24752b + 8750b6 + 28168b3 ￿ 483b7 ￿ 48873b5 ￿ 3136 + 81246b4)
(￿119168b3 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6 + 26799b5 ￿ 4606b4 + 46584b2 + 55664b + 9408)
Hence the equilibrium quantities and pro￿ts for the downstream units are:
qi =
(b ￿ 2)(286b7 ￿ 5995b6 + 40143b5 ￿ 82824b4 ￿ 19976b3 + 51024b2 + 24976b + 3136)(a ￿ 2c)
2(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(46584b2 + 55664b + 9408 ￿ 119168b3 ￿ 4606b4 + 26799b5 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6)
qj =
(47b8 ￿ 1368b7 + 14140b6 ￿ 61031b5 + 90094b4 + 31912b3 ￿ 47976b2 ￿ 24752b ￿ 3136)(a ￿ 2c)
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(46584b2 + 55664b + 9408 ￿ 119168b3 ￿ 4606b4 + 26799b5 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6)
qk =
(30b8 ￿ 1006b7 + 11713b6 ￿ 55807b5 + 88020b4 + 26104b3 ￿ 50112b2 ￿ 24976b ￿ 3136)(a ￿ 2c)
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(46584b2 + 55664b + 9408 ￿ 119168b3 ￿ 4606b4 + 26799b5 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6)
q5 =
￿(￿76b7 + 34919b5 ￿ 14168b3 + 53160b2 ￿ 80750b4 + 17b8 + 25200b + 3136 ￿ 3568b6)(a ￿ 2c)
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(46584b2 + 55664b + 9408 ￿ 119168b3 ￿ 4606b4 + 26799b5 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6)Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Price Interdependencies 38
q10 =
(77b8 ￿ 2088b7 + 19858b6 ￿ 76695b5 + 95290b4 + 38040b3 ￿ 47064b2 ￿ 24752b ￿ 3136)(a ￿ 2c)
(b2 ￿ 9b ￿ 2)(46584b2 + 55664b + 9408 ￿ 119168b3 ￿ 4606b4 + 26799b5 + 391b7 ￿ 6292b6)
￿m = 2(b + 1)q2
i , ￿Dj = q2
j, ￿Dk = q2
k, ￿D5 = q2
5, ￿D10 = q2
10
for i = 1;2, j = 3;4, k = 6;7;8;9.
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